Last October, Russia gave six Soviet-era fighter jets to Serbia free of charge. The Russian defence minister flew out to Belgrade for the handover, making sure the Kremlin’s donation got maximum publicity in a region it sees as its one of its historic spheres of influence. Western security hawks took note, highlighting it as another sign of Vladimir Putin’s expansionist ambitions. The message seemed clear: Russia was back in the Balkans in a big way.

Lost in the noise, though, was the important detail that Serbia would have to stump up the estimated $235 million cost of assembling and modernizing the ageing MiG-29 jets. They were delivered in pieces, by Russian transport aircraft. What’s more, it turned out that Belgrade — which has ambitions to join the European Union — would have preferred U.S. or European aircraft, if it had been able to afford them.

For the price of transporting a few ageing warplanes, the Kremlin got a bargain in geopolitical terms. It shored up its standing in the Balkans and, thanks to the West’s reaction, allowed Russia to leverage this giveaway into something far more valuable — the impression that it is now projecting power on multiple fronts, from Europe to the Middle East and beyond.

In a new book on Russia’s involvement in the Balkans — Rival Power: Russia’s Influence in Southeast Europe — the author Dimitar Bechev makes a convincing case that creating such impressions is the core of its strategy, because it doesn’t have the economic or military might to do more. In other words, the Kremlin is making the most of a hand that is far weaker than it appears. The Kremlin is making the most of a hand that is far weaker than it appears.